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The Medical Studies Act and Allied Medical
Societies: Looking Back at Niven v. Siqueira
Twenty-Five Years Later
Miles J. Zaremski*
It is indeed fortuitous that celebrating twenty-five
years of the Beazley Institute for Health Law and
Policy also causes me to look back upon the twentyfifth anniversary of Niven v. Siqueira, 1 a case I
litigated to the Illinois Supreme Court with one time
partner, Frederic J. Entin. It is equally fortuitous
that on the occasion of Beazley Institute's quarter
century of existence, I found myself reexamining
Niven twenty-five years later in another case, Joseph
Kamelgard v. American College of Surgeons.2 I
suspect it is not often that an Illinois attorney has the opportunity to
reexamine a case he helped litigate twenty-five years earlier. To begin, I
will discuss Niven and its implications.
Essentially, Niven has been the only case in Illinois focused upon the
state's medical peer review statute (colloquially referred to as the Medical
Studies Act (MSA)) and one of the entities mentioned in the act, the "allied
medical societies." The case started when an attorney representing a minor
filed suit against our client, a Chicago-based hospital, and others for
medical malpractice. In the course of discovery, plaintiffs counsel sought
to discover certain documents from what today is known as the Joint
Commission (JC) (formerly, Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals, thereafter, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations). The JC is the main accrediting body for hospitals in the
United States and is located in Oak Brook Terrace, a western suburb of
Chicago. The JC objected to the discovery, asserting that the documents in
its possession were privileged under the MSA, claiming it to be an allied
medical society that ensures or improves care. The Illinois Supreme Court
agreed that the JC fell within the general description of "allied medical
* Esq.,
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societies" as its documents were used in this case to foster improvement of
hospital conditions, patient care, quality control, or to reduce the rates of
death and disease, i.e., reduce morbidity or mortality. Since this decision,
Niven has been a staple of many subsequent Illinois appellate opinions
addressing the parameters of the MSA, notably by opining that the purpose
of this peer review statute is to improve care, period.
As we know, there are several prominent health care organizations in
Illinois; two of the largest are the American Medical Association and the
American College of Surgeons. These and others argue that because of the
language in Niven, they are all allied medical societies due to the functions
of any peer review activities within their organizational structure. It would
be hard to quibble with this in general terms. What is puzzling is that they
also seem to say that since the purpose of the MSA is to ensure health or
quality of care, they can use this state statute as to any member or member's
activity, even if no nexus to Illinois exists for one or both. After all, they
have consistently claimed, we know the purpose intended by the Illinois
General Assembly when this statute came into being and that is merely to
ensure healthcare -there are no geographical limitations as to subject or
activity set forth per the wording of the statute. If these organizations are
correct in their assertions the MSA could apply to any one of their
thousands of organization members in any location. For example, to
someone in Honolulu who testifies as a medical expert or to someone in
San Juan, Puerto Rico, who publishes a medical paper on which new
medical care could be based.
Now, twenty-five years after Niven, the case of Kamelgard v. American
College of Surgeons gave me the occasion of researching whether such
organizations were on point in their advocacy. The hours of research
undertaken and what I found are, to be sure, of critical interest and
importance to all who read this special edition of the Annals. The product
of these efforts should also be useful for every Illinois attorney who wishes
to assert the MSA as a defense to a discovery request arguably protected by
the privilege offered by the MSA. Equally true would be its value for every
Illinois court having to analyze the geographical restrictions, if any, within
the act. I don't believe anyone has ever undertaken, or reduced to a
published writing, this research-at least none that I could locate.
The Illinois Medical Studies Act 3 consists of five sections, though the
first section is the one typically referred to in published decisions. These
five sections were first enacted into law in 1961. One or more of these
sections has been expanded over the years, but it still remains in five
sections. None of the sections have any legislative history, though the
description "allied medical societies" was penned in the first and third
3.

735 ILCS 5.
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sections, as they are to this very day. The reason no legislative history
exists is because there was no mandate to do so until the creation of the
1970 Illinois Constitution. This version of the Constitution requires that
legislative history be kept and recorded. Thus, any legal advocate or jurist
who says what the Illinois General Assembly intended by creating the
MSA, or why certain entities are identified in it, would be fictionalizing the
birth of peer review in our state. It has taken developing case law in Illinois
over the years, as well as looking at legislative history of amendments to
the MSA, other Illinois acts with declared purpose and references to peer
review committees, and looking to other states having similar peer review
statutes, to provide a clear answer.
This journey starts with Jenkins v. Wu, an Illinois Supreme Court
decision the year before Niven, which references legislative history offered
by (then) State Representative Harold Washington when he debated the
1976 amendments to the MSA. He was quite clear that the MSA was
intended to improve quality of care in Illinois and lower the cost of health
care in the state too. Four appellate court cases from 1987-2007 have
echoed this same geographical limitation-Illinois.
While not explicitly stating so, the Niven court referenced the fifth
section of the MSA in determining the situs for health care rendered in a
hospital that is accredited by the Joint Commission. Again, the discussion
centered on accredited hospitals in Illinois.
As further proof that the MSA is focused on ensuring quality care but
only in Illinois, one need only look as well to the Illinois Hospital Licensing
Act, the Illinois Medical Practice Act, the Emergency Medical Services
Act, and the acts that regulate dentistry and podiatry. The former two
statutes were amended in 1987 by one Senate bill with a single statement,
"Because the candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practice is
essential to the provision of adequate hospital (health) care, it is the policy
of this State to encourage peer review by health care providers." The
sponsor of this amendment stated that this sentence was inserted to, "deal
with peer review in Illinois hospitals". Illinois cases have equated this
language to what is contained in the first section of the MSA: promotion of
the state's legitimate interest in improving the quality of healthcare in
Illinois.
In addition, it was also useful to compare the five sections of the MSA
with one another. After all, Illinois law is quite firm that rules of statutory
construction require that any interpretation of a statute be done so in light of
the objectives and purposes of a statute as a whole, and that words within a
4
statute should be consistent with one another. Since the MSA lacks a
legislative history when it was created forty-nine years ago, case law can be
4. Nola Wilson v. Michael Molda, 918 N.E.2d 1165, 1173 (1st Dist. 2009).
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a suitable substitute to define purpose and objective. Concomitantly, by
looking at the websites for the entities specifically mentioned in the MSA
(particularly the first and third sections), it is clear that they pertain to
Illinois, Illinois citizens and Illinois physicians.
The same is true if one looks at amendments to the MSA over the years:
they all pertain to Illinois. One amendment dealt with changing the
description in the first section of the act from "inter-insurance exchanges"
to "insurance companies." Why, you ask, was this done? The Illinois State
Medical Society specifically requested this change because its insuring arm
for Illinois member physicians no longer was referred to as an interinsurance exchange.
Not to be outdone by the above analyses, nearly every, if not all, states
have their own MSA in spirit, if not in words. Thus, one would ask, why
would any entity claim that it could use the Illinois version of peer review
to govern a member unknown to Illinois practice and medicine? For this
writer, that question will always remain puzzling. Similarly, the esteemed
Washington, D.C. based Institute of Medicine, in its well regarded book, To
Err is Human, commented on the MSA and similar state statutes. Therein,
the following is stated, "No [peer review] statute expressly covers systems
or collaborations that cross state lines." The notion that peer review is
state-based could not be articulated more clearly.
Furthermore, there is jurisprudence of over 150 years, both from the
United States Supreme Court as well as from our own state high court, that
unalterably holds that health care and its regulation is within the police
powers of every state to regulate and oversee. Likewise, peer review
statutes exist to promote the public, health, safety and welfare within each
state-the exact purpose why states are given the power to supervise health
care within its own borders.
Atop this piece, I mention the case of Kamelgard v. American College of
Surgeons. The facts are fairly simple. Dr. Kamelgard (Kamelgard) testified
in a New York federal medical malpractice case as a plaintiffs expert
against a New York physician who treated a New Jersey resident in a New
York (Long Island) hospital. After a defense verdict, the defendant doctor
filed a complaint with the American College of Surgeons (ACS), a
professional organization in which he was a Fellow and member. The
claim was that Dr. Kamelgard provided improper expert testimony. After
months of investigation, the ACS charged Kamelgard with violating its
rules and scheduled a hearing on these charges for some weeks later.
Kamelgard retained legal counsel, who wrote a lengthy letter to the ACS
that included the fact that New York court records indicated that the New
York doctor Kamelgard testified against had been sued at least 30 times
before. Within weeks of receiving this letter, the ACS postponed its
hearing for unknown reasons, and then dropped the charges.
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Thereafter, Kamelgard filed in March 2009 a petition in the Circuit Court
of Cook County pursuant to Rule 224 of the Illinois Supreme Court the
names of those who may be responsible to him in damages for improperly
investigating him. Although Kamelgard was unknown to Illinois practice
and medicine, the ACS through its counsel at the time asserted the Medical
Studies Act as a defense to the discovery Kamelgard sought. The first trial
court found in favor of the ACS. That decision was found to reflect an
abuse of discretion, and was reversed.5 It is also interesting to note that the
appellate court also discussed in its opinion that the trial court had initiated
ex-parte communications with the ACS attorney.
The case was then returned to the Circuit Court of Cook County and
assigned to a second judge. After a lengthy hearing and an equally long
written opinion, it was determined that the MSA applied to allied medical
societies of which the ACS was one, Kamelgard's petition for the names he
sought was denied. This trial court held that (1) testifying as an expert
impacts patient care (relying on the dicta, albeit incorrect, offered by Judge
Posner in the Austin case), and that (2) the purpose of the MSA' peer
review process is to improve patient care. Since the MSA does not by its
words contain geographic boundaries regarding the subject or activity under
peer review, the purpose of the MSA is served even though Kamelgard
testified in New York and had never been to Illinois to practice medicine in
any capacity. Because it was considered aberrant to the scholarship on peer
review and where it can be undertaken, the analysis by the second trial court
on the scope and purpose of the MSA by an allied medical society deserved
another appeal, which Kamelgard undertook in April 2009.
First, the words Judge Posner penned in the Austin case about testifying
being a medical service were not well thought out and reflected an
incomplete analysis of medical practice. Decisions in Florida and in
Minnesota have disagreed with Posner's view on the subject. It would also
be imprudent to make such a declaration, considering that if testifying is a
medical service like examining a patient then whenever an out-of-state
expert comes to court to testify in Illinois, (s)he would have to be licensed
to practice medicine per the Medical Practice Act. There is no provision for
testifying as a medical service. More importantly to the discussion of the
MSA here, the testimony that was the subject of the Austin case never
occurred in Illinois; it occurred in Missouri.
As of submission of this article, our appellate court has yet to rule in
Kamelgard. It will be interesting to see how it decides the MSA issue.
To briefly conclude, the Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy has
no doubt enjoyed a wonderful development over the last quarter century;
5. See 385 Il1.App.3d 675 (1 Dist. 2008).
6. See 2001 WL 34115583, *1.
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however, it may have been a less arduous task than Dr. Kamelgard has had
to endure in his journey through the Illinois court system over the last two
plus years. Regardless, it has been an unwelcomed pleasure for me to look
back twenty-five years on Niven and then to be able to "update" it as
precedent as more fully described in the preceding pages of this piece.
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